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Abstract
We study complementarity between product and process innovation in a monopoly setting.
First we consider the possibility for the firm to alternatively invest only along one of the
two directions and compare the incentives of process vs product innovation. Then we allow
the firm to invest simultaneously in both activities, showing that both investment levels
as well as the profit are higher than in case of individual investment. Product and process
innovations are then complementary and the firm always prefers a simultaneous adoption.
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1 Introduction
The theory of comparative statics, initially investigated by Samuelson, has recently re-
ceived renewed attention thanks to the improvement in the theory of supermodular games,
introduced by Topkis (1978) and further studied by Milgrom and Roberts (1990a, 1990b,
1995), Vives (1990) and Amir (1996), inter alia. The issue of complementarity has be-
come a leading field of research both in games with strategic complementarities among
the strategies of the players and in games with players that face multidimensional strategy
space.
The study of innovative activity has represented one of the first field where complemen-
tarity has led to very interesting results. In particular, the analysis of product innovation
and process innovation has been recently enriched by many contributions. While in a re-
cent past the focus has been on the choice between these two types of activities, recent
works tend to stress the possibility that some complementarities may appear when the two
innovative activities are taken together.
Athey and Schmutzler (1995) analyze several features of a firm’s long-run decisions
about organizational structure that aﬀect its short-run innovative activity. In particular,
they consider an investment in research capabilities that improves future opportunities for
new product and process innovation. Product innovation is formalized as an upward shift
in the demand curve, while process innovation lowers the marginal cost of production. The
authors focus on the conditions under which product and process innovations, as defined
in this way, are complementarity and the returns accruing from one type of innovation
are at highest when the firm also adopts the other type. This clearly induces the firm to
implement both types of innovation at the same time.
Lin and Saggi (2002) investigate the relationship between process and product innova-
tion both under Bertrand competition and under Cournot competition in a duopoly model
with diﬀerentiated goods. Following the conventional view on the timing of adoption, they
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build a three stage game where firms first choose their investment in product innovation,
then the investment in process innovation and finally they compete either in prices or in
quantities.1 In their model product innovation aﬀects the degree of product diﬀerentiation
by reducing product substitutability. The eﬀect on the output by those two kinds of R&D
leads to a two-way complementarity in which the investment in one makes the other more
attractive. As a consequence, firms invest more in product innovation when they can un-
dertake also process innovation. Moreover, the equilibrium level of process innovation is
an increasing function of the degree of product diﬀerentiation.
Other papers deal with the topic of product and/or product innovation without taking
into explicit account the issue of complementarity. Lambertini and Orsini (2000) analyze
the incentive to introduce process and product innovation in a vertically diﬀerentiated
monopoly. Rosenkranz (2003) considers a two-stage Cournot duopoly model with hor-
izontal diﬀerentiation, where in the first stage firms simultaneously choose the product
characteristic and the unit cost. Eswaran and Gallini (1996) examine the role of patent
policy in redirecting the mix of product and process innovation towards a more eﬃcient
technological change. Bonanno and Haworth (1998) provide an interesting duopoly model
which explains the R&D choice according to the type of competitive regime where firms
operate (Cournot vs. Bertrand), even if firms are not allowed to conduct both types of
R&D.
In this paper we analyze a monopoly case where the firm faces the possibility of investing
1Abernathy and Utterback (1975 and 1982) and Klepper (1996) propose a “technological life-cycle”
model in which firms initially direct most of their R&D resources to product innovation and then move
to process innovation. The main argument is that the returns to product innovation are at highest at the
very beginning because they depend on the acquisition of new consumers, while the returns to process
are very attractive in a second time becuase they are proportional to the level of output produced by the
firm. Adner and Levinthal (2001) recently moved some critics to what they called a “supply-side” view
of technological change in favor of a “demand side” approach where technology changes are driven by the
interaction between technology development and consumers’ heterogeneous demands.
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both in product and in process innovation. Product innovation shifts the demand curve by
increasing consumers’ willingness to pay, while process innovation takes the conventional
form of a reduction in the unit cost of production.
We initially consider the alternative for the firm to invest only along one direction
and compare the profitability of process vis à vis product innovation.2 Two factors will
determine which innovative activity has to be carried out: (i) the relative eﬃciency of
product vs process innovation; (ii) the potential market expansion vs the potential cost
reduction. The first factor reflects the conventional approach based on comparing the
cost of implementing diﬀerent innovative activities, while the second factor points out that
initial conditions may play a fundamental role in such a decision.
The second part of the paper deals with the possibility for the firm to invest in both
activities at the same time. The aim is to show that demand enhancing product innovation
and cost reducing process innovation are complementary. The firm obtains then a higher
profit when it invests simultaneously along both directions, because the gains brought about
by the market enlargement expand the returns arising from the reduction of the unit cost of
production. Moreover, we verify that complementarity holds even in circumstances where
the firm is impeded from market constraints to invest at the optimal level.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present the basic model and consider the
cases where the firm invests only along one direction, either process or product innovation.
Section 3 provides a comparison between the two types of innovative activities. In Section
4 we move to the case where the firm invests in both activities at the same time, focusing
on the presence of complementarity and its eﬀects on equilibrium investment levels and
overall profit. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2Halmenschlager (2004) considers a modification of the standard two-stage model wherein two high-
cost firms conduct cost-reducing R&D, in a setting with spillovers, and then Cournot compete against a
low-cost firm that engages in no R&D.
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2 The model
Consider a monopoly case where a firm produces a homogeneous good at the marginal cost
c. The inverse demand function is linear and given by
p = a− bq (1)
where a represents the initial marginal willingness to pay and b the slope (in absolute value)
of the demand function. We assume that the firm produces without incurring in any fixed
cost. The profit function is then given by:
π = (p− c) q (2)
From profit maximization we get the equilibrium quantity q∗ =
a− c
2b
by which it can be
easily computed the equilibrium profit:
π∗ =
(a− c)2
4b
. (3)
Let introduce the alternative for the monopolist to activate R&D along two diﬀerent
directions, either process innovation or product innovation.
2.1 Process innovation
The firm is allowed to invest in a type of R&D that lowers the marginal cost of production,
i.e. it does process innovation R&D. Following the common assumption of diminishing
returns for R&D expenditures (see d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Qiu, 1997), the
cost is given by c(x) = γ
x2
2
, where x indicates the investment level in process R&D while
γ inversely measures the eﬃciency of such R&D technology: the higher its value, the
more expensive (i.e. the less eﬃcient) is process R&D, and viceversa. The profit function
becomes:
πx =
(a− c+ x)2
4b
− γx
2
2
(4)
4
The monopolist maximizes w.r.t. x; the profit function is concave when γ > γ1 =
1
2b
and by using first-order conditions we get the equilibrium investment level in process R&D:
x∗ =
a− c
2bγ − 1 (5)
Moreover, we take into account a feasibility condition that guarantees the presence of non-
negative costs of production. This requires x∗ ≤ c, where c represents an upper bound in
the possibility of invest to abate production costs, and it holds when:
γ ≥ γ2 =
a
2bc
. (6)
It is easy to verify that γ2 > γ1. In γ1 < γ < γ2, the profit function is concave in
x but the optimal value x∗ is out of reach, given that it would entail a negative cost of
production. The monopolist sets then x = c and obtains the profit:
πc =
a2 − 2bc2γ
4b
(7)
which is always positive and greater than (3) in the interval under consideration.
When γ ≥ γ2 the monopolist is ‘free’ to select the optimal investment level (5) and
obtains:
π∗x =
(a− c)2
2(2bγ − 1) (8)
Lastly, in 0 < γ < γ1 the profit function is convex in x and one has to compare the
profits accruing at the extrema of the variable choice, i.e. πc (where x = c) vis à vis π∗
(where x = 0). It is straightforward to verity that πc > π∗ and the firm invests in process
innovation up to the admissable limit, due to the very high eﬃciency of such activity (very
low values of γ). We can summarize the above discussion as follows:
Remark 1 When 0 < γ ≤ γ2, process R&D is very eﬃcient and the firm sets x = c
obtaining the profit πc, while for lower levels of process R&D eﬃciency, i.e. when
γ > γ2, the firm chooses x = x
∗ < c and gets the profit π∗x.
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2.2 Product innovation
The firm invests in product innovation to raise consumers’ reservation price. Similarly
to the previous case, the cost is given by c(y) = δ
y2
2
, where y indicates the investment
level and δ inversely measures the eﬃciency of product innovation R&D. We assume that
implementing product innovation shifts the market demand outward. The profit function
becomes:
πy =
(a− c+ y)2
4b
− δy
2
2
, (9)
which is concave w.r.t. y when δ > δ1 =
1
2b
. In this case, the first-order condition gives
the equilibrium investment level in product R&D:
y∗ =
a− c
2bδ − 1 (10)
As for feasibility requirements, we assume that the demand expansion due to the in-
crease in the reservation price cannot exceed a maximum level parameterized by A. As
a consequence, we impose an upper bound on the optimal investment level in product
innovation given by y∗ ≤ A− a , which holds if:
δ ≥ δ2 =
A− c
2b(A− a) . (11)
Notice that δ2 > δ1; as before, we have to consider two subintervals. In δ1 < δ < δ2 the
equilibrium level y∗exceeds the maximum demand enlargement; the monopolists is obliged
to fix y = A− a, obtaining
πA =
(A− c)2 − 2b (A− a)2 δ
4b
(12)
which is always positive and greater than (3) in the region that we consider.
In δ ≥ δ2 the monopolist chooses the optimal investment level (10) and gets:
π∗y =
(a− c)2
2(2bδ − 1) (13)
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Finally, in 0 < δ < δ1, the profit function is convex in y and by comparing πA (where
y = A− a) vis à vis π∗ (where y = 0) we verify that πA > π∗: the firm invests in product
up to the admissable market expansion. Then:
Remark 2 When 0 < δ ≤ δ2, product R&D is very eﬃcient and the firm sets y = A− a
obtaining πA, while for δ > δ2, i.e. for lower levels of product R&D eﬃciency, the
firm chooses y = y∗ < A− a and gets the profit π∗y.
Caveat: market expansion and utility function In our model product innovation
shifts the demand function by raising consumers’ willingness to pay. The net eﬀect of
such R&D investment is doubtlessly equivalent to an investment in advertising that shifts
demands curves. In general, any demand enhancing investment activity gives rise to a
complex issue if it also shifts the individual utility function from which the demand curve
is derived, as initially pointed out by Dixit and Norman (1978).3 The usual criticism
regarding the welfare comparisons also applies to the profit comparisons carried out in our
model.
We can therefore use a relative measure that captures the ability of the monopolist to
extract profit from total surplus, usually defined as the sum of consumers’ and producers’
surplus. In the benchmark case, where the monopolist does not carry out any investment
activity, demand is stuck at the initial level (1) and profit is given by (3). Total surplus
can be easily computed and amounts to:
TS∗ =
(a− c)2
2b
. (14)
It follows immediately that:
EE∗ =
π∗
TS∗
=
1
2
(15)
3See also Martin (2002), Ch. 9, for a comprehensive discussion.
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where EE stands for extraction eﬃciency, the fraction of total surplus that the monopolist
is able to capture.
Take now into account the case where the monopolist is allowed to invest in product
innovation. Demand function becomes py = a− bq + y and total surplus is given by:
TSy =
(a+ y − c)2
2b
. (16)
Backward induction solution gives rise to first-stage profit function (9) and the firm’s
extraction eﬃciency is the given by:
EEy =
πy
TSy
=
1
2
− δby
2
(a+ y − c)2
. (17)
As it can be easily noticed:
EE∗ > EEy (18)
meaning that the fraction of total surplus that the monopolist is able to extract diminishes
in the product innovation case. In absolute terms, however, cash flows are higher in case
of demand expansion generated by product R&D than in case of no investment, and the
monopolist decides to invest. The same reasoning applies for the process innovation case.
3 Process vs product innovation
In the previous part we have considered the choice of process R&D separately from the
choice of product R&D. Remind that the monopolist sets x = x∗ < c for γ > γ2 and x = c
for 0 < γ ≤ γ2, while it chooses y = y∗ < A− a for δ > δ2 and y = A− a for 0 < δ ≤ δ2.
In Figure 1 we represent all the possible regions of interest in the comparison between the
two types of innovation.
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Figure 1: Process vs product R&D
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We have then to perform the following comparisons:
• in region I ( γ > γ2 and δ > δ2): π∗x vs π∗y;
• in region II (γ > γ2 and δ < δ2): π∗x vs πA;
• in region III (γ < γ2 and δ < δ2): πc vs πA;
• in region IV (γ < γ2 and δ > δ2): π∗y with πc.
First of all we compare γ2 and δ2 and find that:
γ2 > (<)δ2 iff A− a > (<)c. (19)
We define the potential increase in consumers’ reservation price as large (small) when
A − a > (<)c, and product (process) innovation is likely to be more profitable for firms.
The following analysis will shed light on the eﬀect of product and process innovation in
the decision between the two kinds of activities.
Let us begin from Region I. It is easy to prove that:
π∗x < (>)π
∗
y when δ < (>)γ.
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Furthermore, when δ < (>)γ then y∗ > (<) x∗. In line with the theoretical assumption
of our model, when δ < γ, the firm prefers to invest in product innovation because it can
be implemented at a lower cost. The opposite holds when δ > γ and the firm chooses
process innovation instead.
In the other regions the result crucially depends not only on the relative eﬃciency
of process vs product innovation, but also on the potential shift in the demand function
as compared to the potential reduction in the marginal cost of production. We find the
following results:
• When A− a > c:
— in Region II πA > π∗x;
— in Region III πA > πc for 0 < δ <
(A− c)2 + 2bc2γ − a2
2(A− a)2b = δA(< δ2);
— in Region IV π∗y > πc for 0 < δ <
2bc2γ − a2
2bc2(1 + 2bγ)− 4abc = δc(> δ2).
• When A− a < c:
— in Region II π∗x > πA for 0 < γ <
(A− c)2 − 2(A− a)2bδ
2b(A− a) [A+ a− 2c− 2(A− a)bδ] = γA
(> γ2);
— in Region III πc > πA for 0 < γ <
a2 − (A− c)2 + 2(A− a)2bγ
2bc2
= γc(< γ2);
— in Region IV πc > π∗y.
Moreover, it is important to notice that the size of the four regions, being delimited by
values taken by γ2 and δ2, depends in turn on the relative shift in the demand function,
as we know from (19). In Figure 2 we represent the decision choice between process and
product innovation in the {γ, δ} space in the two cases introduced before. In the left panel
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the potential demand expansion is supposed to be large, while in the right panel it is taken
as small.4
Figure 2a: A− a > c
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The above representation clarifies the importance of initial conditions in deciding whether
to invest in product or in process innovation. When the potential demand enhancement
is large, the firm prefers product innovation. In particular, when both activities are very
eﬃcient, i.e. when both γ and δ are suﬃciently low, the firm chooses product innovation
because it arrives at the maximum expansion of the demand by spending a limited amount
of money. Not only product innovation is very eﬃcient, but also the perspective of market
enlargement is very appealing. The opposite holds when the potential demand expansion is
small: the firm prefers process innovation because it finds unprofitable to devote resources
to product R&D in a situation where the perspectives of raising consumer’s reservation
price are limited.
The following proposition summarizes the above discussion:
Proposition 1 When the potential demand enlargement is large, i.e. when A−a > c, the
firm prefers to invest in product innovation, while the opposite holds when A− a < c.
4We draw both pictures by taking b = 1, c = 1, a = 1.5. In the left panel we further impose that A = 3,
hence A− a > c, while in the right panel A = 2 and A− a < c.
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Hence, the choice between product and process innovation is dictated not only by the
relative eﬃciency of the two activities but also by the potential demand expansion as
compared to potential cost reduction. This result clearly indicates that initial conditions
play a crucial role in determining the investment decision between product and process
innovation. In other words, it suggests a closer attention to the nature of the product
itself. In case of technologically “mature” goods, the possibility of furtherly shifting market
demand is somehow limited and the firm concentrates on process innovation. On the
contrary, new-to-the-market goods are usually very attractive for consumers and product
innovation turns out to be more profitable.
4 Process and product innovation
In this section we analyze the possibility for the firm to invest in both kinds of R&D.
The aim is to show that process and product R&D, as they are defined in our model, are
complementary.
The profit function is given by:
πx,y =
(a− c+ x+ y)2
4b
− γx
2
2
− δy
2
2
(20)
Separate concavity with respect to each investment level still requires:
∂π2x,y
∂x2
< 0 for γ > γ1 and
∂π2x,y
∂y2
< 0 for δ > δ1, (21)
while joint concavity with respect to both investment decisions holds if:
γ > γ3 =
δ
2bδ − 1 , (22)
where γ3 > γ1.
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First, notice that:
∂2πx,y
∂x∂y
=
∂2πx,y
∂y∂x
=
1
2b
> 0, (23)
hence the two activities are complementary. Following Topkis (1978), in fact, a function
is supermodular when cross-partial derivatives between each pair of variables are positive.
This formalizes the notion of complementary investment opportunities. Any increase in
one of the two variables raises the profitability of implementing the other. The economic
interpretation is that the marginal returns from a demand enhancement investment activ-
ity increase with a reduction of the marginal cost due to process innovation. Alternatively,
since supermodularity is a two-way complementarity relationship, an equivalent interpre-
tation is that the benefit that the firm derives from a reduction of the marginal cost of
production increases with the overall demand, i.e. with the acquisition of new consumers.
Assume for the moment that (22) holds; equilibrium investment levels are:
x∗x,y =
δ (a− c)
2bγδ − γ − δ > 0, (24)
y∗x,y =
γ (a− c)
2bγδ − γ − δ > 0. (25)
Obviously, the firm devotes more resources to product (process) when γ > δ (γ < δ)
and its R&D portfolio depends on the relative eﬃciency of the two activities. It is easy to
show that:
x∗x,y > x
∗ and y∗x,y > y
∗.
Due to the complementarity eﬀect, both the investment level in process innovation and the
one in product innovation are higher than in the case of investment along one direction.
As for the equilibrium profit, by plugging (24) and (25) in (20) and rearranging, we
get:
π∗x,y =
(a− c)2 γδ
2(2bγδ − γ − δ) > 0 (26)
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which is higher than (8) and (13).
Another consideration deserves attention. As it stands, the overall eﬀect of process
innovation is exactly the same as the one of product innovation, given that both shift the
demand curve outward. It can be argued that the separation of the two innovative activities
taken into account in our model is somewhat unnecessary. However, this simply implies the
presence of cost complementarity between the two options. When there are diminishing
returns for R&D expenditures, two separated units working on demand expansion, one
directly through an increase of consumers’ willingness to pay and the other indirectly
through a cost reduction, exploit complementarity and yield a higher profit for the firm.
Finally, one may argue that the results derived in the previous section are strongly
aﬀected by the adoption of a linear demand function, given that the solution basically
depends on a change in (a− c). Even if similar results can be shown to hold if one
considers more complex demand and /or cost functions, we prefer to present an easy
case where complementarity always holds because this allows to propose a model that
combines technological and demand factors and to stress on the role played by initial
conditions. Moreover, due to its simple structure, we are able to completely characterize
the equilibrium solutions also in presence of market constraints, as it will be discussed in
the following section.
4.1 Market constraints
In this section we consider the feasibility constraints that the firm faces when invests
simultaneously in product and process innovation. Under (22) equilibrium investment
levels are (24) and (25). Nonetheless, we need to verify the feasibility conditions, x∗x,y ≤ c
and y∗x,y ≤ A− a, yielding:
Lemma 1 (i) x∗x,y ≤ c when γ ≥ γ4 =
a δ
c(2bδ − 1) , with γ4 > γ3, (ii) y
∗
x,y ≤ A− a when γ
≥ γ5 =
(A− a)δ
2bδ(A− a)− (A− c) , with γ5 > γ4 in δ2 ≤ δ ≤ δ3 =
A
2b(A− a) .
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In Figure 3 we represent in the {δ, γ} plan the additional feasibility requirements:
Figure 3: Feasibility conditions
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In Region 1, where γ > max {γ4, γ5}, the firm is ‘free’ to choose (24) and (25). As we
pointed out, the equilibrium investment level in both activities as well as the profit are
higher than in case of investment only along one direction.
In Region 2, where δ < δ3 and γ4 < γ < γ5, the firm hits the constraint on product in-
novation. As a consequence, it sets the highest admissable level, y = A−a, and recomputes
the optimal investment in process innovation, which is equal to:
bxa = A− c
2bγ − 1 . (27)
Concavity of the profit function now only requires γ > γ1. It is immediate to prove
that x∗ < bxa < x∗x,y. The equilibrium level of process innovation is still higher than in
the individual case but it is smaller than in the unconstrained case, due to a weaker
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complementarity eﬀect that derives from a lower investment in product innovation than in
the optimal value. Moreover, notice that bxa < c for γ > γ6 = A
2bc
(> γ1) and Region 2
expands then to include δ < δ3 ∪ γ6 < γ < γ5. The equilibrium profit becomes:
bπa = (A− c)2 γ − (A− a)2δ(2bγ − 1)
2(2bγ − 1) > 0 (28)
and it can be easily proved that it is lower than the profit obtained in Region 1. One
might wonder whether the monopolist still prefers to invest in both activities when at least
one of them is constrained by the market conditions. By considering all the admissable
alternatives, i.e. π∗x, π
∗
y (for δ > δ2) and πa (for 0 ≤ δ ≤ δ2) it is possible to show thatbπa corresponds to the highest admissable profit. Hence, in this parameter’s region, there
still exists a suﬃcient complementarity to make the monopolist willing to invest in both
directions.
In Region 3, where δ > δ3 and γ5 < γ < γ4, we face the opposite situation with respect
to the previous case, but the results are analogous. The monopolist is obliged to fix x = c
and recomputes the optimal level of product innovation, given by:
byc = a
2bδ − 1 (29)
and y∗ < byc < y∗x,y. Concavity holds if δ > δ1, while byc < A− a for δ > δ3. The area that
we consider expands to δ > δ3 ∪ γ < γ4. The equilibrium profit is then:
bπc = a2δ − c2γ(2bδ − 1)
2(2bδ − 1) > 0. (30)
The monopolist is obliged to set a lower value of process innovation then the optimal
one and this reduces both the equilibrium level of product innovation and the equilibrium
profit. By considering all the admissable alternatives, i.e. π∗x, π
∗
y and πc it is possible
to show that bπc corresponds to the highest admissable profit. Complementarity is again
strong enough for the monopolist to invest in both activities.
Finally, in Region 4, that after the previous considerations amounts to δ < δ3 ∪
γ < γ6, the firm either faces constraints on both directions or neither joint concavity
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nor single concavity are preserved. In γ > γ3, for example, the two activities are still
complementary and the profit function is joint concave but the optimal investment levels
cannot be reached. The firm could set x = c and y = A− a and get:
bπac = A2 − 2bc2γ − 2b(A− a)2δ
4b
(31)
which is always positive in the parameter region that we consider. Moreover, it is easy
to demonstrate that such a profit is the highest the firm can obtain. The same argument
holds also when γ < γ3 and either the profit function is not jointly concave or it is concave
only w.r.t. one investment activity, and it even holds when it is convex w.r.t both process
and product innovation investment levels.
We can summarize the main results as follows:
• 1) x = x∗x,y, y = y∗x,y and π = π∗x,y;
• 2) x = bxa, y = A− a and π = bπa;
• 3) x = c, y = byc and π = bπc;
• 4) x = c, y = A− a and π = bπac.
From the above discussion, it emerges that:
Proposition 2 Complementarity between process innovation and product innovation is
preserved under feasibility constraints on equilibrium investment levels.
As a result, the firm always prefers to activate both types of R&D activity, even in
parameters’ regions where feasibility constraints limit the amount that can be invested.
However, this happens when either one or both innovative activities are very eﬃcient and
the firm decides to invest a lower-than-optimal level and enjoy complementarity gains.
Finally, it is worth noting that the combination between technological features, sum-
marized by the relative eﬃciency of process and product innovation, and initial conditions
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on market demand and cost structure determine the amount of resources devoted to each
innovative activity.
5 Conclusions
We have investigated a monopoly case where a firm can invest in product innovation which
expands market demand and in process innovation which reduces the marginal cost of
production. We have initially considered the two activities as separate decisions and have
drawn interesting conclusions regarding the choice of the firm on whether to invest in
process innovation or in product innovation. In particular, we have focused on the role
played by the initial condition of the market, i.e. on potential demand improvement vs
eﬀective cost abatement.
The second part of the paper has dealt with the simultaneous implementation of process
and product innovation. We have shown the existence of complementarity between a
demand enhancing activity and a cost reducing one. As a consequence, the firm always
prefers to invest in both activities at the same time to maximise its profit. Furthermore,
we have demonstrated that such complementarity is preserved even in case of constraints
on equilibrium investment levels. In other words, even in circumstances where market
conditions do not allow for a considerable cost reduction and/or demand expansion, the
firm gets a higher profit when invests in both activities rather than when it implements
only one of them. Initial conditions act in combination with eﬃciency considerations to
determine firm’s optimal R&D portfolio.
Finally, we have highlighted the existence of a cost complementarity that reinforces the
result that a joint adoption of the two activities is more profitable than the adoption of a
single activity.
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